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Abstract: Decentralized forest management is an  important policy issue in India and elsewhere. 
Yet, there are few careful studies of the impacts of community forestry. We try to fill this gap by 
analyzing National Sample Survey data from 524 villages in five states in India.  Our analysis 
seeks to answer two key questions:  a) Who participates in community forestry and what are the 
determinants of participation? and b) What is the impact of participation on household fuelwood 
consumption?  We find that proximity to forests, leadership, and fuelwood dependence are 
significant factors in explaining village participation in community forestry.  Household 
participation is strongly correlated with scarcity, a result that has implications for a recent policy 
to expand community forestry from degraded to less degraded forests.  Our most important 
findings are that fuelwood consumption and participation are linked, and household participation 
has a significant positive impact on consumption. However, the presence of a village level forestry 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Only a few years ago, community management of forests was viewed as an experimental 
strategy.  Today, it is a part of government and donor orthodoxy in forestry investment. In 
many parts of the world, communities living on forest fringes or within forests have re-
gained some control over the management of these resources.  For instance, in Nepal, 
community forest management was instituted in 1993 and is now viewed as a policy that 
has helped stem forest degradation (Edmonds 2002, Bardhan and others 2002).  Klooster 
(2000)  has examples of co-management of forests in Mexico leading to increased profits 
to local communities; and, Wily (2002) estimates that at least 4,500 rural communities in 
Africa are involved in some form of forest management.  Thus, decentralized forestry is a 
worldwide phenomenon.  The rights of local forestry communities have been strengthened 
either through management-sharing arrangements with the state, increased legal access to 
forests, or decentralization within government agencies.   
 
Decentralized forestry has benefited from donor support, numerous studies documenting 
the ability of communities to efficiently manage common-pool resources, and a shared 
consensus among development practitioners about the benefits of decentralization. Yet, it 
is not clear that we understand the impacts community-oriented forestry.  Does 
participating in decentralized forest management result in extraction of more or less forest 
products?  Are there any differences in forest income between participating and non-
participating households?  Does this form of forest management improve the welfare of 
poor households?  Does community forestry result in conservation of resources?  These are 
some of the questions that require answers.  In this paper, we seek to partially answer these 
questions by analyzing data on community based forest management in rural India.   
 
While there are numerous case studies that evaluate community forestry, very few are 
based on large datasets and present quantitative results that are generalizable to more than 
a few communities.  Edmonds (2002) studies the impact of community forestry on 
resource extraction in Nepal; this is one of the few efforts to quantitatively assess whether 
this government program had an impact of fuelwood extraction.  Edmonds shows that 
there is an approximately 14% reduction in fuelwood extraction that can be attributed to 
the creation of forest user groups in the short-term.  He builds on a tradition of quantitative 
program evaluation that is well established in the development literature but is relatively 
unknown in environmental studies.  We use similar evaluation techniques to assess the 
impact of community forestry in India on fuelwood consumption. 
 
Our study focuses on community forestry in India.  We are interested in a government 
program known as Joint Forest Management (JFM) as well as traditional village level 
forestry institutions.  JFM was launched in the early 1990s and made it possible for the 
forestry department to involve people and communities in the management of certain 
forests.  JFM caught on very quickly, and by 2001 some 45,000 JFM groups were 
protecting approximately 12 million hectares of government forests (Kumar, 2002).
1  
However, several authors and practitioners contend  that JFM falls short of its goals, and 
                                                 
1 The total land area coming under community management is likely to be much higher as the above figures 
do not include the many traditional groups which are not recognized under JFM.   3
that in many cases it has had a negative effect on fuelwood use by the poor (Khare and 
others 2000, Sundar 2000, Sarin and others, 1988).  We pursue this line of reasoning and 
ask whether participation in JFM or other forms of traditional community forestry 
programs has resulted in a change in forest resource consumption.   
 
We ask two main questions:   a) Who participates in community forestry and what are the 
determinants of participation? and b) What is the impact of participation on household 
fuelwood consumption?  Fuelwood consumption is treated as an indicator of resource use 
as well as household welfare. To answer these questions, we use a database of 524 villages 
and 8,307 households in five states in India.  This data are obtained from the fifty-fourth 
round of the National Sample Survey of India.  Our data do not allow us to distinguish 
between state-initiated (JFM) and other traditional (self-initiated or historic) forms of 
community forestry (CF).
2 We include both types of forestry projects in our definition of 
community forestry. 
 
The first part of our analysis focuses on villages that are engaged in community forestry.  
Here we try to understand what determines village choice to participate in CF activities.  
The goal is also to examine if there are some institutional biases toward socially and 
economically better-off villages.  Our results do not support the existence of any clear 
biases.  Proximity to forests, the presence of an educated person in the village (which we 
treat as a proxy for leadership) and fuelwood dependence are significant factors in 
explaining village participation in community forestry.  Social and economic heterogeneity 
do not appear to influence collective action. 
 
At the household level, we assess who participates in community forestry and whether this 
has an effect on fuelwood consumption.  There are two distinct and opposite ways in 
which community forestry can affect fuelwood consumption.  If community forestry 
results in net restrictions on forest use, we expect to see a decline in fuelwood 
consumption.
3   However, if community forestry results in forest regeneration and if forest 
closure is carefully planned, then medium and long-term program effects will not be 
negative.
4  Even in the short term, households that participate in community forestry may 
have better access to forest resources.  This will happen where community and state 
agreements result in plantation work, forest clearing, lopping, and other forest management 
activities that make fuelwood or fodder available (Khare and others 2000).  This is the 
ideal way in which CF should work – we seek to assess whether it works in this fashion in 
reality.   
 
To summarize our main household level results, we find that household participation in CF 
is influenced by state geographic and policy differences, literacy, fuelwood scarcity, caste 
and occupational groups, and peer group effects.  A key policy relevant result is that 
scarcity is correlated with participation.  This suggests that new government guidelines to 
                                                 
2  Orissa and Uttar Pradesh in particular include both varieties of community organizations. 
3  Forest conservation is a key goal of traditional and state-initiated community forestry and has resulted in 
restrictions on fuelwood use in many JFM cases (Khare and others 2000).   
4 When coppicing species such as teak are planted as part of forest management, fuelwood benefits accrue 
even in the short-run.   4
expand JFM from more to less degraded areas (where fuelwood is likely to be less scarce), 
need to be cautiously implemented.  The rapid growth in JFM witnessed in the 1990s may 
not be replicable.  
 
Our findings regarding fuelwood consumption reinforce the poverty-environment 
hypothesis, which suggests that fuelwood collection will decrease with wealth because of 
increased opportunity costs of labor and changes in preferences (Bardhan and others 2002).  
In our data, consumption is closely tied to collection, and decreases with increases in 
assets.  Fuelwood consumption is also sensitive to scarcity indicators such as price and 
availability of village commons.   
 
Our most important conclusion is that participation in community forestry significantly 
influences household fuelwood use.  We find that participating households consume 744 
kgs of fuelwood more than non-participant households.  In rural India, fuelwood 
consumption can be considered an indicator of welfare, -- thus, our results show that self-
reported participants benefit considerably from community forestry. 
 
CF programs are meant to influence the entire village.  Membership is intended to be 
universal and everybody is expected to benefit somewhat from the program.  However, our 
analysis suggests that the presence of a CF program in the village does not have a 
significant effect.  This implies that while community forestry markedly benefits certain 




Our analysis shows that participants gain significantly from CF programs.  Community 
forestry in India appears to be a case where some participants actively join a village forest 
institution and are rewarded for their membership.  There is no obvious economic 
discrimination related to who does or does not join.   Households who do not join, i.e., 
those who do not claim to be participants -- either because it is not important to them, or 
because of ignorance, or for some other reason -- do not gain in the short to medium term.  
We conclude that programs designed to increase participation in community forestry are 
important.   
  
 
2.  Community Forestry and Joint Forest Management in India 
 
India’s national forest policy of 1988 was a landmark policy for local people’s rights over 
forest resources.  The policy recognized people’s participation in using and protecting 
forests and suggested the forest communities should develop and conserve forests together 
with the state forest departments. This reform in forest policy has begun to transform how 
forests are protected and used in India.  Communities that were historically perceived to be 
encroachers and illegal users of forests by the state were invited to partner with the state in 
protecting forests.  Following national implementation  guidelines in 1990, various state 
                                                 
5 Note that our definition of benefits is limited to fuelwood consumption and does not reflect other benefits of 
community forestry such as timber benefits, NTFP related gains, or, enhanced eco-system services.   5
governments began implementing their own Joint Forest Management strategies. By 2001, 
some twenty-two states had adopted JFM (Agarwal 2001).   
 
Under the terms of JFM, Village Forest Institutions (VFI)
6 are given conditional access to 
specified forest products in accordance with the guidelines laid by the forest department.   
The products usually include fuelwood, fodder, and non-timber forest products.  Forest 
departments also provide VFI’s with information, training, and wage employment related 
to forest management.  Initial community funds may also be provided.  In many states, 
JFM resolutions mandate that villagers be solicited to make micro-plans for forests 
(Sundar 2000).  Organizing into a VFI can result in access to wage employment and 
fuelwood through forest management activities such as lopping, clearing of debris, and 
cutting.   
 
In return, VFIs agree to certain conditions such as collective protection of the forest against 
encroachment, poaching or timber smuggling, and, monitoring of restrictions on some 
types of use.  After a period of protection ( 5 to 10 years or more), the VFI and its 
members are entitled to 25 to 100 percent of the net income from the sale of major forest 
produce, timber (Khare and others 2002). Commercially valuable non-timber forest 
products have in the past been nationalized and unavailable, but this is changing.   
 
The organization structure and membership rules of VFIs differ in each state.  For 
example, in Andhra Pradesh, all households living in a JFM village are eligible for JFM 
membership.  While membership is optional for the general population of the village, it is 
automatic for ST and SC households  (GOAP 1996).  In Madhya Pradesh and Orissa, two 
persons (one of which must be a woman) from each household living in the JFM village 
are automatically considered members (GOO 1993 and GOMP 1996). In Uttar Pradesh, 
membership to JFM is either automatic to the village residents who are registered in the 
electoral rolls of the village or those who are existing members of the forest panchayat 
system (GOUP 1997).  In West Bengal, only “economically backward people living in the 
vicinity of forests” are considered to be members.  However, every family living in the 
vicinity of the forests has the option of becoming a member (GOWB 1990).  In general, 
VFIs have an executive committee that makes major decisions.  VFIs have no independent 
legal existence as they are usually registered with the forest department alone.
7  Authority 
to enforce protection varies.  
 
In addition to state supported joint forest management,  India has a history of community 
forest management undertaken either by self-initiated groups, with NGO support, or 
initiated in colonial times with British support (Ghate 2003, Khare and others 2000, 
Ballabh and others 2002, Agarwal 2001, Lise 2000).   These ‘traditional’ groups are 
particularly evident in the states of Orissa, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh  and Jharkhand.  For 
example, in Orissa, only 1,200 out of the approximately 5,000 community forest 
management groups are estimated to participate in JFM. (Singh 2002).  It appears that 
                                                 
6 The Village forest Institutions are known by various names in the different states. For example in Andhra 
Pradesh, they are known as Vana Sanrakshana Samithi (VSS) and as Forest Protection Committees (FPC) in 
Orissa. 
7 The exception is Gujarat, where committees are registered under the co-operative society act (Sundar 2000).   6
these traditional groups are often not officially recognized under JFM rules, and in many 
cases are compelled to change their structure and functioning in order to be officially 
recognized and receive benefits associated with JFM (Sundar 2000, Khare and others 
2002).
8   
 
Many papers have been written on the effectiveness of JFM and other community based 
efforts to manage forests.  While these provide excellent insights in community efforts, 
they tend to be case studies and cannot be generalized.  For example, Kumar (2002) bases 
his work on  five villages in Ranchi district, and concludes that the JFM regime reflects the 
preferences of the rural non-poor.  Lise (2000) focuses on factors influencing participation 
in three types of community forestry in ten villages in Haryana, Uttar Pradesh and Bihar.  
He concludes that participation in community forestry is associated with forest 
dependence, low average family education, high respondent education and greater 
involvement of women.  Heltberg (2001) determines the impact of local institutions on 
JFM, using data from a protected area in Rajasthan.  He suggests that in order for JFM 
institutions to be more effective, they need to build on existing local institutions and 
involve non-government organizations.  Chopra and Dasgupta (2002, 2003) also conclude 
that JFM type initiatives should be based on pre-existing institutions and should be 
complemented with appropriate land use policies.  Alsop  and others (2002) study three 
World Bank aided projects and reinforce some of these conclusions.  They conclude that 
while forestry and non-forestry user groups are working well in terms of delivering 
benefits, they may require additional support in order to be sustainable in the long-run 
(Alsop and others 2002).    
 
Some authors writing about JFM contend that this program may hurt rather than help poor 
women and villagers who depend on fuelwood.  Sundar (2000) and Sarin and others 
(1988), for example, argue that JFM, by closing off access to certain forests, helps well-off 
villagers who can secure alternate sources of fuelwood but burdens poor villagers. Agarwal 
(2001) focuses on ‘participatory exclusion’ of women within JFM regimes.
 9  She finds 
that women bear significant costs associated with loss of access to forests, additional time 
spent to collect fuelwood and fodder, use of alternate inferior fuels, scarce supply of 
fuelwood even after forests have regenerated, and inequitable distribution of community 
benefits.    Agarwal argues that participatory exclusion is a broad phenomenon in South 
Asia and is found in many traditional and new collective action efforts.  
 
In an excellent and broad review of Joint Forest Management, Khare and others (2000), 
show that JFM has been very successful in spreading rapidly and  has been widely 
implemented in India.  They suggest that JFM is resulting in improved forest cover and its 
potential for timber harvesting is being slowly realized (particularly in West Bengal).   
JFM has resulted in legitimizing people’s use of forests and in village development 
through the use of JFM related funds – however, Khare and others (2000) contend that this 
is true in some and not most cases.  Many challenges remain.  Forest departments tend to 
                                                 
8 For instance in UP, the JFM order of 1997 required the existing Van Panchayats to accept in writing that the 
Panchayat rules no longer apply under JFM (Khare and others, 2000).   
9 Agarwal (2001) bases her work on 87 community forestry groups in 5 states in India and two districts in 
Nepal.     7
view JFM as a tool to protect or rehabilitate millions of hectares of degraded forests, while 
village communities see it as a means to meet scarce needs and to increase income.  
Communities are also heterogeneous and have different requirements, often resulting in 
conflicts.  Further, VFIs seem to function better when JFM is implemented along with 
wage employment in forest management, and, where there are budgetary allocations for 
villages.  Thus, for more effective VFIs, Khare and others (2000) recommend that short 
term returns, access to alternative fuel sources prior to forest closure, and intra-community 
equity issues need to be addressed. 
 
The vast literature on community forestry in India helped us understand how communities 
organize to manage forests collectively and what the relationship is between fuelwood 




4.  Data  
 
We use data from the fifty-fourth round of India’s National Sample Survey (NSS), 
undertaken between January and June of 1998.  The fifty-fourth round was the first 
national survey in which household and village level information was collected regarding 
common property rights and resources in India.  The survey focused only on rural India. 
 
Though the scope of the fifty-fourth round of NSS was national, we focus on five large 
states. These are Andhra Pradesh (AP), Madhya Pradesh (MP), Orissa (OR), Uttar Pradesh 
(UP), and West Bengal (WB).  These are the states with the largest number of community 
forest management groups in 1998.
10  These are also states for which reasonable data were 
available in the national sample survey.  JFM started officially around 1990 – thus, on 
average, our secondary data is likely to be picking up villages where CF has been prevalent 
for some five years.  In states such as West Bengal, where CF originated in the 1980s, and 
in  Orissa and Uttar Pradesh, which have large numbers of traditional forestry institutions, 
we can assume that community forestry has been prevalent for a much longer term.    
 
The NSS collected village and household level information.  Village level information was 
obtained from local officials and knowledgeable persons, including but not limited to local 
revenue and forest department officials.   Our sample includes 524 villages from the five 
states. From each village, roughly 16 households were randomly identified and surveyed 
for socio-demographic characteristics, forest dependence and participation in forest 
management.  Thus, our household sample size is 8,307 households. 
 
The main variable of interest at the village level is the existence of a forest management 
body in the village.  The village level questionnaire asks the question “Is there any local 
forest management body like JFM, Van Panchayet etc.?” This information collected at the 
village level is distinct from household participation in forest management activities.  Our 
                                                 
10 According to figures presented by Khare and others (2000, figure 5.1, p. 83), in 1988, AP had a little less 
than 5,000 village forest institutions, MP approximately 8,500 VFIs,  Orissa more than 5,000 VFIs, UP some 
4,000 VFIs, and West Bengal some 3,000 VFIs.     8
data shows that it is possible for a village not to have a forest management body and yet 
households living in the village may participate in forest management.  On the other hand, 
not all the households sampled living in a village with forest management body, participate 
in forest management. 
 
We use four measures to identify the quantity and quality of forest resources --  total 
government forest area in hectares, total village common land in hectares, a dummy if the 
village had any forests within the village, and a dummy if a village had forests outside its 
boundary that was accessible.  The relative scarcity of fuelwood was measured by village 
level fuelwood price aggregated from household level reported quantities and values of 
fuelwood collection, consumption and sale.  We also create a variable of CF intensity, 
which measures proportion of sampled households that are CF participants in a village.   
 
Our main variable of interest at the household level is a participation dummy for 
households who report that they are members of a community based forest management 
organization.  The question asked was “Whether the household or any of its members has 
membership in a local body involved in Joint Forest Management / Van Panchayat?” The 
survey defined CF to include traditional local groups (NSSO, 1999).  Thus, members of 
any community based forest management organization may respond positively to this 
question.  Further, some households sampled from a CF village may respond negatively to 
the participation question even where membership was automatic.  Thus, we interpret the 
response to the question of a household being a member of a community forest 
management program to be an indicator of participation rather than an indicator of 
membership.   
 
Another key household variable is annual fuelwood consumption by the household.  
Separate questions were asked regarding fuelwood consumption during last the 365 days 
from (1) village common/ panchayat land, (2) village forests and van panchayat forests (3) 
government forests and (4) other locations.  We aggregate fuelwood consumption from 
these four separate sources.  In general fuelwood consumption needs are met by 
households’ own collection.
11  State regulations vary in terms of defining fuelwood and the 
purpose for which it may be collected.  Some states allow sale of collected fuelwood while 
others do not.
12   
 
Data on the Level of education of each household member were collected in the survey 
from a different set of sample households as compared with the households surveyed for 
common property resources.  Thus, the household data on education could not be used 
                                                 
11 68 percent of households collected fuelwood and 2.5 percent sold some fuelwood.  Less than one percent 
of household did not collect any fuelwood but consumed some during the year before survey. 
12 For example, in UP the JFM rules indicate fallen fuel may be collected only for bona fide  domestic use 
(GOUP 1997).  In Orissa, government document states that “…brush wood, fallen lops, tops, twigs used as 
fuelwood shall be available to the members free of costs (GOO 1993) .” However, sale of fuelwood is not 
ruled out in Orissa and MP.  In MP, revenue for fuelwood sale is to be shared with the village forest 
committee (GOMP 1996).  In WB, collection of fallen twigs is allowed free of royalty.  Members of 
scheduled tribes enjoy extra rights and privileges granted by the state government in 1981.  These rights may 
not be curtailed by the JFM committees (GOWB 1990).     9
directly.
13  Instead, we proxy education by a literacy indicator about whether or not a 
member of the household reads the newspaper. 
 
Appendix tables A1 and A2 present data on the differences in various village and 
household characteristics between participants in community forestry and non-participants. 
The typical participant in community forestry is a poor household that lives on the fringes 
of forests (see Table A.2).  Over half the participating households are agricultural laborers, 
while only 3% are headed by females.  Eleven percent of these households have at least 1 
literate member.  Some 38% of participants belong to scheduled tribes, 7% to scheduled 
castes and another 39% to other backward classes.  Participant households, on average, 
own less than 1 ha of land, but 22% own an asset such as a radio or TV or telephone. 
 
 
4.  Methodology 
 
Our paper seeks to answer two key questions: a) What are the determinants of participation 
at the village and household levels in community forestry? and, b) What are the impacts of 
participation on household fuelwood consumption?   
 
We treat domestic consumption of fuelwood as an indicator of dependence on forest 
resources for subsistence as well as a measure of household welfare.  Household and 
village participation in CF affect fuelwood use. This relationship exists because in some 
cases community forestry restricts forest use, and, in other cases, it results in forest 
management activities that increase access to fuelwood.  Further, households that are 
dependent on scarce fuelwood are more likely to participate.  Thus, we model jointly 
household fuelwood consumption and participation in CF.   
 
In the following paragraphs, we first discuss the determinants of village level participation 
in community forestry.  This is followed by a discussion of household participation and 
impacts on fuelwood consumption.  We use three methods to assess impacts – simple 
comparison of means, maximum likelihood estimation, and propensity score matching. 
 
A.  Probit Model of Village Participation 
 
There is considerable theoretical and empirical literature on conditions for durable 
commons institutions and why cooperation in managing natural resources occurs in some 
cases and fails in others. Agrawal (2001), for example, identifies 24 conditions (see Table 
1)  based on three synthesis books by Wade (1988), Ostrom (1990) and Baland and 
Platteau (1996). This literature has greatly improved current understandings of common 
property institutions and helped promote decentralization in natural resource management.  
We have built on this literature in our model of why a village may choose to participate in 
community forest management. Our analysis is in the tradition of many other empirical 
papers that use forest groups as a unit of analyses to understand cooperative behavior 
(Heltberg 2001, Varughese and Ostrom 2001). 
                                                 
13 The 54
th round of National Sample Survey of India included two household questionnaire modules that 
were asked to different households.     10
 
In our analyses, we consider the decision of a village to engage in a community forestry 
program to be influenced by three types of variables, state, village, and households.  First, 
different state forest policies may differentially influence village decisions participate in 
community forestry.  Second, village stock of forests, infrastructure and availability of 
public service may also influence the decision of a village.  Finally, characteristics of the 
residents themselves such as prior experiences with other community based organizations, 
education and leadership qualities, social diversity, and dependence on forest resources are 
likely to influence the decision to collectively manage resources.  These are factors that are 
often identified in the commons literature as being useful for understanding cooperation.     
 
We estimate the probability of a village to be in a community forestry program by a probit 
model written as: 
  ( ) ( ) η + + Φ = = V c c JV 1 1 Pr   (1) 
where JV is an indicator variable for CF village and V is a vector of village characteristics 
and η is the error term.  The independent variables used in the estimation of (1) and the 
reasons for using them are discussed below.   
 
We use four state dummies, Andhra Pradesh (AP), Madhya Pradesh (MP), Uttar Pradesh 
(UP), and West Bengal (WB) taking value one if a village is located in that state and zero 
otherwise, to test for differences in state geography and policies.  Orissa (OR) is the default 
dummy.  Forest Dummy takes the value one if the village reports forests within its 
jurisdiction.  We expect the Forest Dummy to have a positive coefficient as villages with 
access to forest resources are more likely to join the community forestry programs.  
Villages with access to forests outside the village boundaries may join CF to protect their 
own forests and degrade outside forests for domestic use. We test this hypothesis by 
including Forest outside village in our analysis as a dummy variable.  A significantly 
positive coefficient for this variable would imply villages with access to outside forests are 
more likely to join CF as compared with those with no access to outside forest.  Majority 
fuelwood dependent is a dummy with value one if the village reported that the majority of 
the households use fuelwood.  Our data does not permit us to test for endogeneity of 
fuelwood dependence at the village level. 
 
There is considerable literature on access to markets and its impacts on common property 
institutions (Agrawal 2001).    Access to markets and increased opportunities for labor and 
resource exchanges outside the village are generally believed to make cooperation a less 
desirable strategy. Thus, we expect better access to external markets, as measured by  the 
all weather road dummy, to reduce forest dependence and make CF in the village less 
likely.   
 
Higher presence of public service offices, measured by Post Office, should make a village 
participating in CF more likely.  Higher leadership capacity of the village, measured by 
middle school education, and, existence of other self-help groups in the village should also 
make CF more likely in a village.  A village where majority of households are fuelwood 
dependent is more likely to engage in CF.  Thus, we hypothesize that the coefficients of 
these variables are positive.  The Land Gini coefficient measures economic inequality.    11
Residents of a village with unequal land distribution are expected to find it more difficult 
to take collective action.
14   
 
We test the hypotheses of institutional social discrimination against scheduled tribes, 
scheduled castes, and other backward classes. Proportion ST, proportion SC, proportion 
OBC are proportions of respective social groups within the village.  If a disadvantaged 
social group, say scheduled caste, is institutionally discriminated against, we would expect 
a village with a higher proportion of scheduled caste household would be less likely to be a 
CF village.  We test whether the coefficient of proportion of SC is negative and significant.  
Similarly we test for discrimination against proportion of ST and proportion of OBC.
15  
 
Note that there may be considerable time lag between the CF village selection decision and 
our data.  Particularly for traditional CF, a village may have decided on CF many decades 
before the survey.  The selection of state-initiated CF village may have taken place three to 
five years before the survey.  As a result, the initial conditions such as the quality of forest 
at the time of CF village selection may not be true at the time of survey.  Thus, we interpret 
our analyses as estimating the relationship between willingness to engage in collective 
action and various exogenous factors. 
 
B.  Evaluating the Impacts of Participation on Fuelwood Consumption 
 
We are interested in two related decisions made by rural households:  whether to 
participate in CF activities, and how much fuelwood to consume.  These two decisions are 
interlinked.  To evaluate the impact of participation we focus on the question how much 
does fuelwood consumption change because of the participating households’ decision to 
participate in CF.  To answer this question we need to know how much fuelwood a 
participating household would have consumed if it did not participate.  However, the 
answer to this hypothetical question is not observable in the data.  So we construct 
matching comparison groups of non-participant  households to estimate the answer.   
 
The accuracy of the quantified impact of participation depends on how the comparison 
group is constructed.  Let αi be the true impact of household participation on fuelwood 
consumption.   
  i i i F F 0 1 − = α   (2) 
where F1i is fuelwood consumption if household i participates in CF and F0i is fuelwood 
consumption if household i chooses not to participate.  However, since a household cannot 
both be participant and non-participant at the same time, we cannot observe the true impact 
                                                 
14 The empirical literature on the impact of heterogeneity on collective action is ambiguous (Agrawal 2001).  
Baland and Platteau (1996), for example, conclude that heterogeneity of endowments may lead to improved 
natural resource management but heterogeneity of interests and identity may have the opposite effect.  In 
general, this is an issue that remains to be resolved.  
15 We also constructed a social heterogeneity index based on the proportion of households belonging to 
various social groups to test for the effect of heterogeneity on collective action – these results are presented 
in the Appendix.   
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of participation on fuelwood consumption.  Instead, the observed fuelwood use of 
household i can be expressed as: 
  i i i i i F J F J F 0 1 ] 1 [ − + =   (3) 
where Ji = 1 if household i is participant in CF and zero otherwise.  Given the impossibility 
of observing the true impact of participation in fuelwood consumption, the goal is to get an 
unbiased estimator of α for the average household.   
 
In the following paragraphs, we consider three measures of estimates of α.  The first is the 
simple difference in mean fuelwood consumption between participating and non-
participating households.   The second is the joint maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) 
measure of α.  And the third is the propensity score based measure of α.  Further details on 
evaluation methods for non-experimental data can be found in Ravallion (2001), and, 
Blundell and Costa Dias (2000). 
 
 
Comparison of Mean Differences between Community Forestry Groups 
 
This method essentially involves comparing the mean fuelwood consumption between two 
groups of households and villages: those participating in community forestry and the non-
participants. The differences in mean consumption between the two groups is expected to 
capture the impact of  participation. A significant t-test suggests that community forestry 
increases mean consumption and household welfare.   However, while mean comparisons 
are useful, they could simply be an artifact of proximity to forests or other household and 
village characteristics.  Thus, in the following sections we try to control for differences 
between participant and non-participants and then assess impacts.   
 
MLE Measure of Household Participation and Fuelwood Consumption 
 
The mean difference between participants and  non-participants would be an unbiased 
estimator of α if participant households were randomly selected.  However, we know that 
participation is voluntary and self-reported.  We control for observable household and 
village characteristics so that the impact of CF participation is conditioned on observables.  
Second, some of the factors that help a household decide whether to participate, also 
determine the level of fuelwood consumption.  Thus, we treat participation and fuelwood 
consumption as jointly determined and then test to see if this hypothesis is valid. 
 
Consider the level of household participation in CF to be a function of a vector of 
exogenous covariates and a random component ε. 
  i i i i i i JV PJ V b H b b J ε β β + + + + + = 2 1 2 1
*   (4) 
where H is a vector of household characteristics other than household size, V is a vector of 
village characteristics, JV is a CF village indicator variable taking value one if CF village 
and zero otherwise, and, PJ is proportion of CF participant households in the village 
measuring the peer effect of participation. However, note that the level of participation is 













   
The CF participation and fuelwood consumption equations may then be written as : 
 
  () ( ) i i i i i i JV PJ V b H b b J ε β β + + + + + Φ = = 2 1 2 1 1 Pr   (5) 
  i i i i i i i e JV J V a HS H a a F + + + + + + = 2 2 1 α α   (6) 











We estimate robust standard errors to take into account heteroskedasty arising from 
omitted variables of village heterogeneity.   
 
The correlation coefficient ρ accounts for the possibility that fuelwood consumption and 
CF participation decisions are jointly made by households.  To test this hypothesis we 
jointly estimate (5) and (6).
16  The rationale of this estimator is to control directly for the 
part of the error term in (6) that is correlated with household participation in CF.
17  This 
estimator also maximizes the likelihood function and is known as the maximum likelihood 
estimator.  The iterative process used allows us to estimate ρ and to test the hypothesis ρ 
=0.  We report results from the maximum likelihood estimations, as well as probit 
estimates of (5) and OLS estimates of (6) for comparison. 
 
Determinants of Household Participation and  Fuelwood Consumption 
 
In this section, we discuss the choice of the independent variables in equations (5) and (6).   
Equation (5) estimates the determinants of household participation.  Similar to the village 
level equation, in equation (5), we hypothesize that household participation depends on 
institutional design and forest policies that differ by state, resource indicators,  village 
infrastructure, household specific social and economic characteristics, and whether there 
are others in the village that also participate in community forestry.   
 
Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal are state dummies 
taking value one for households in these states. The state dummies represent differences in 
rules that affect the perception of costs and benefits of participation.  To some extent, they 
capture differences between traditional and historical community forestry institutions (UP 
and Orissa) and state supported institutions (AP, MP and WB).   
 
                                                 
16 There are many variations of this model in the literature.  We implement Maddala’s (1983) version. 
17 The two step iterative procedure works as follows.  In first step the part of e that is correlated with J is 
estimated from (5).  It is then included in (6) and the effect of participation on fuelwood consumption is 
estimated in the second step.  By construction, the error term of the modified equation (6) estimated in the 
second step is not correlated with the participation decision.  The second step provides new estimates of e 
and the two steps are repeated until the system converges.     14
We use two indicators to measure resource stock, total area under government forests and 
total area under village common land. The all weather road dummy takes value one if 
such a road exists within the village - all weather road is a proxy for access to market and 
fuel substitutes. 
 
Fuelwood price measures relative scarcity of fuelwood at the village level. We hypothesize 
that resource scarcity increases the probability of participation.  Fuelwood price is 
endogenously determined by village level fuelwood stock, demand for fuelwood, and 
availability of substitutes.  Thus, it is likely to be correlated with other village level 
variables such as total area under government forests and all weather road.  When used as 
an independent variables in (5) and (6), fuelwood price can result in multicolinearity with 
other village level  variables.  Typically multicolinearity results in unbiased coefficients 
but larger standard errors. We do not find any significant correlation between fuelwood 
price and other village level variables.  The estimated standard errors of the village level 
variables are small enough to make the corresponding coefficients statistically significant.  
Thus, we conclude multicolinearity is not a significant problem in our estimations. 
 
The endogeneity of village level fuelwood price and its relationships with unobserved 
village characteristics such as forest cover density may result in clustered heterogeneity of 
the error terms of  (5) and (6).  That is, the standard errors of the error terms are likely to 
be different for each village.  To correct for this possibility we calculate robust standard 
errors adjusted for village level clustering. 
 
Household characteristics likely to influence participation are wealth, education, 
occupational and caste categories, and age. We proxy household wealth by asset index.  
The asset index is constructed from the hectares of land possessed by the households and 
ownership of phone, radio, and TV. The construction of the asset index is based on Filmer 
and Pritchett’s (2001) methodology.  Wealth is expected to have an ambiguous effect on 
participation.  If CF is perceived to increase long-term returns to participation, then wealth 
will likely increase the probability of participation.  However, if CF is perceived to 
increase short-term returns to participation, the sign on the wealth measure is likely to be 
negative. 
 
We use a number of other variables to control for household level characteristics.  The 
variable read newspaper takes the value one for those households where newspapers are 
read. The variable fuelwood used for consumption and enterprise takes the value one for 
those households that use fuelwood for domestic consumption and as input to family 
enterprise.  The dummy variables self employed in non-agriculture, agricultural labor, 
nonagricultural labor, and other nonagricultural occupations take the value one for 
households that report the respective occupational type.  The reference group is ‘self 
employed in agriculture’.  The variable female headed households takes the value one for 
those households with female heads. Schedule Tribe, Schedule Caste, and Other Backward 
Class are variables that take the value one for households in respective social groups.   
 
The proportion of sampled households in a village participating in CF is measured by PJ.  
This measures the effect of peer pressure on participation.  Higher peer pressure may make   15
participation in CF more likely for a household.  However, peer pressure to participate in 
CF should not have any direct effect on fuelwood consumption.
18  Similarly, HS or 
household size has a direct effect on fuelwood consumption. Larger households is likely to 
need more fuelwood.  However, household size does not directly influence participation.  
Thus, inclusion of PJ in (5) and not in (6) and inclusion of HS in  (6) and not in (5) helps 
identify both the equations.   
 
Now we turn to consumption of fuelwood or equation (6).  Consumption of fuelwood is a 
function of state dummies, reflecting differences in state fuelwood policies, household 
characteristics, scarcity indicators, including fuelwood price, a dummy to capture program 
effects i.e. village participation in CF, and a dummy to capture household participation in 
CF.   
 
Agricultural labor households are expected to consume more fuelwood, while households 
in non-agricultural occupations are likely to have access to other sources of fuel.  We 
hypothesize that indicators of wealth and literacy have a negative effect on fuelwood 
consumption.  Fuelwood is an inferior good -- as a household’s income and wealth 
increases, it is likely to switch to other more clean fuels.  Age and female headed status of 
the household are hypothesized to have a negative impact on consumption.  This is because 
consumption is closely tied to collection and we expect older and female dependent 
households to collect less.  On the contrary, households with more members will consume 
more. 
 
Fuelwood prices reflect local scarcity.  Thus, we expect the usual negative relationship 
between prices and demand even if markets for fuelwood are thin.
19  We use two other 
measures of resource scarcity – total government forest land and village common land – 
we expect these to be positively associated with consumption.   
 
The signs of CF village and participation dummies are empirically determined.  We 
assume CF village selection is exogenous to fuelwood consumption and use it as one of the 
independent control variables in household consumption of fuelwood (6) and CF 
participation (5).  This assumption is motivated by the fact that our data was collected 
approximately five years after CF was instituted as a government approved program, and, 
in Orissa and Uttar Pradesh, community forestry started before that.  As a result, initial 
condition such as depleted forest resources that lead a particular village to embrace CF 
may not be true during the survey.  We also note, not all CF participant households reside 
in CF villages.  To the extent that CF villages  have been able to regenerate forests, we 
expect a positive relationship.  However, if regeneration has not resulted in opening up of 
closed forests for fuelwood collection, then the relationship can be negative.   
 
                                                 
18 It is possible that peer-pressure has an indirect effect on consumption by affecting fuelwood supply.  
However, we found no correlation between peer-pressure and consumption. 
19 While fuelwood prices are endogenous at the village level, at the household level, fuelwood prices are 
exogenous to consumption decisions.  That is, a single household cannot change fuelwood price by its own 
fuelwood consumption decisions.   16
We hypothesize that participation can increase consumption of fuelwood. If households 
that participate have access to forest management activities such as clearing or lopping 
trees, then they may be able to procure and consume more fuelwood.   Better knowledge of 
rules and regulations and access to leaders would also enable greater collection and 
consumption. 
 
Propensity Score Based Matching 
 
Our third technique to evaluate the impact of participation, propensity score matching, is 
based on identifying a comparison group similar to participants.  If we have a comparison 
group that mimics the group of participant households well, the comparison group is a 
good proxy for the counterfactual.  To identify the comparison group of non-participants 
we use propensity scores based on (5).  To match participant households with non-
participant households, we use three alternate methods: nearest method, radius matching,  
and Gaussian kernel weighted matching.  We also match participant villages with non-
participant villages. 
 
In nearest neighbor matching, a participating household (or village) is matched with a non-
participating household with the closest propensity score.  In radius matching participating 
households are matched with nonparticipating households that have propensity score 
within 0.1 radius of the propensity score of the participating households.  Kernel matching 
method uses weighted average of information from all the non-participating households to 
arrive at the counterfactual for each participating households.  The weights are based on 
Gaussian kernel.   
 
In all cases we only used households with propensity score in the common support range to 
identify the comparable non-participating households.  The standard errors were 
bootstrapped to determine the statistical significance of the differences in fuelwood 




In this section we outline the results on village and household participation and their 
determinants as well as the impact of participation on fuelwood consumption. 
 
A.  Village Participation in Community Forestry 
 
The summary statistics of the village level variables used are in table 1.  The mean column 
for the dummy variables represent the proportion of villages where that dummy variable 
takes the value one.  For example, 8 percent of the 524 villages report presence of CF, 
while 43 percent report having government forests within the village.  In an average 
village, 19 percent of the sample households belonged to the social group of scheduled 
tribe and 37 percent of the villages reported that majority of the residents depended on 
fuelwood as fuel. 
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The estimation results of village level participation are in table 2.  Only three variables are 
significant in explaining village level participation – villages with government forests 
within village boundaries, villages with at least one member with middle school or higher 
education, and, villages where the majority of households are dependent on fuelwood.  The 
positive and significant relationship of the three indicators with the probability of 
participation is expected.   
 
Explanatory variables that are not statistically significant in explaining the probability of 
CF participation are important too.  For example, anecdotal evidence suggests villages 
with access to forests outside their boundary may choose to protect their own forests and 
exploit those outside.  Thus, such villages may be more likely to participate in the CF 
program.  However, our results do not support this hypothesis. 
 
Villages with access to markets and government services represented by all weather roads 
and post offices may be more likely to participate in CF program if the program is 
implemented in more accessible areas.  This has been shown to be the case in the CF 
program in Nepal.  Further, theory suggests that the existence of self-help groups within a 
village may make the community experienced in community based organizations and make 
participation in CF program more likely.  Our results do not support either of these notions. 
 
The hypothesis of institutional bias suggests government officials may not promote CF in 
villages with higher proportions of disadvantaged social groups such as scheduled tribes, 
scheduled castes, and other backward classes.  Though the coefficient of the proportion of 
scheduled caste households in a village is negatively related to the probability of 
participation, it is not statistically significant.  Thus, our results do not support the 
hypothesis of institutional bias against these social groups. We also find that the presence 
of VFIs cannot be explained by economic or social heterogeneity.
20 
 
B.  Determinants of Household Participation in Community Forestry and Fuelwood 
Consumption 
 
Table 3 presents the standard descriptive statistics of the variables used in (5) and (6). 
Table 4 shows the estimation results of (5) estimated as probit in a single equation and as 
part of a joint estimation of the two equation system.  The Wald test of independence of 
equations (5) and (6) cannot accept the independence hypothesis at better than one percent 
level.  This confirms our intuition that (5) and (6) are not independent and MLE estimation 
is appropriate.  
 
                                                 
20 We also tested the hypothesis that social heterogeneity in the village hinders CF group formation by 
constructing an index of social heterogeneity based on proportions of households of ST, SC, OBC, and other 
groups.  Appendix table A.3 shows estimation of village level participation with social heterogeneity as one 
of the determinants.  We find the coefficient of social heterogeneity of the expected sign but statistically not 
significant.  
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The MLE estimation results for (5) can be summarized as factors that make participation of 
a household in CF less likely and those factors that make participation more likely. We 
cannot reject the following hypotheses regarding factors that make CF less likely for a 
household:  (a) households that use fuelwood for domestic and entrepreneurial purposes 
are less likely to participate in CF;  (b) households reporting non-agricultural labor as the 
main occupation are less likely to participate in CF;  (c) schedule caste households are less 
likely to participate in CF; and,  (d)  households that live in village with more village 
common land are less likely to participate in CF. 
 
As expected, we find that the probability of participation in CF increases where fuelwood 
prices are higher, reflecting local scarcity; at least one household member reads a 
newspaper, and there is a higher proportion of CF households in the village, indicating 
knowledge and peer group effects. 
 
Table 5 shows the results of (6) estimated as a single regression (OLS) as well as jointly 
estimated with (5) (MLE).  The most important results of this paper regarding CF on 
fuelwood consumption are presented here.  We find that households residing in CF villages 
consume as much fuelwood as those residing in non-CF villages.  However, households 
that participate in CF consume significantly more fuelwood as compared with the 
households that do not participate.  This implies the CF program does not benefit all 
residents of the CF village in terms of higher fuelwood consumption.  However, the 
program does benefit the participant household.  Since CF participant households consume 
more fuelwood, we conclude that these households have greater access to fuelwood as 
compared with households who do not participate in the CF program.   
 
Among other factors that determine fuelwood consumption, household occupation plays a 
role.  As compared with households self employed in agriculture, the agricultural labor 
households consume more fuelwood and households in other non-agricultural occupations 
consume less.  Given different opportunity costs of fuelwood collection, the differences in 
fuelwood consumption between different occupational categories are expected. 
 
Scheduled tribes is the only disadvantaged social group that consumes significantly more 
fuelwood as compared with the general sample.  This confirms the hypothesis that 
scheduled tribes are more dependent on forest resources for their subsistence as compared 
with others.   
 
Ownership of land, phone, radio, and TV reflect greater wealth of the households. The 
asset index is based on the principal components of these assets and is associated with 
lower consumption of fuelwood.  Education reflected by readers of newspaper in the 
households may increase the opportunity costs of fuelwood collection and has a negative 
relationship with fuelwood consumption.   
 
We tested the hypothesis that female headed households are discriminated against 
participating in CF and found no evidence of it.  Similarly we find the female headed 
households do not consume significantly less fuelwood as compared with their male 
headed counterparts. Households with more members consume more fuelwood.   19
 
The coefficient of fuelwood price is negative, large, and statistically significant.  Thus, we 
cannot reject the hypothesis that the village fuelwood price reflects relative fuelwood 
scarcity.  Total government forest and total village common are both sources of fuelwood, 
and, larger areas may reflect larger supply of fuelwood (given forest quality).  We find that 
households in villages with larger forest and village commons consume more fuelwood. 
 
C.  Impact of Participation on Fuelwood Consumption 
 
The first part of table 6 identifies simple mean differences in fuelwood consumption 
between participating and non-participating households and villages.  Our results show that 
households who report that they participate in community forestry consume almost 260 
kgs more fuelwood than households that do not participate.  This difference is statistically 
significant.  Further, average fuelwood consumption in villages that are CF villages is 27 
percent greater than that in non-CF villages.  Among CF participants, households that do 
not read newspapers consume four times more fuelwood as compared with households that 
read newspapers.  Among participating households, ST, SC and OBC households consume 
16 percent less fuelwood as compared with other social groups. 
 
Because participants and non-participants are not randomly selected, we know that the 
results from the comparison of simple means are biased.  A superior estimate is the MLE 
estimate based on multivariate analysis of participation and consumption decisions.  The 
second part of table 6 re-states the results from the MLE estimates. It shows that 
households who participate in community forestry consume 744 kgs of fuelwood more 
than the non-participant households.  At the same time, the effect of village participation in 
CF is insignificant.   
 
The third part of table 6 shows the average effect of household and village participation in 
CF on fuelwood consumption.  Results of three matching methods, nearest neighbor, 
radius, and kernel weighted are reported.  This effect is positive and significant when 
participating households are matched with non-participating households using the radius 
method.  Thus, this result supports the MLE result that household participation in 
community forestry has a positive and significant effect on household fuelwood 
consumption.  The average change in fuelwood consumption that can be attributed to CF at 
the village level is not statistically significant in any of the three methods.  This result also 
supports the result based on MLE.  
 
6.  Conclusions 
 
Our goal in this paper is to understand why certain Indian villages and households 
participate in community forestry while others do not, and to obtain an answer regarding 
the welfare impacts of decentralized forest management.  Because of the availability of 
data, we use fuelwood consumption as an indicator of forest use as well as household 
welfare.  This is a reasonable indicator – most poor rural households are fully dependent 
on fuelwood for their energy needs.   
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We find that the incidence of village forest institutions can be explained by their obvious 
proximity to forests, the presence of an educated person in the village, and a clear 
dependence on fuelwood.  Our results reinforce traditional wisdom that local leadership is 
critical for collective action institutions to begin and be sustained.  They also highlight the 
importance of fuelwood as an impetus for community forestry. 
 
An interesting policy finding is that a household in MP and UP is more likely to participate 
in community forestry relative to a household in Orissa.  Thus, forest policies in these two 
states seem to better facilitate CF participation.  Another key result is that scarcity is 
strongly correlated with participation.  JFM has, in its second phase, expanded to non-
degraded forests as well as degraded forests.  While this is generally considered a good 
idea, our findings suggest that some caution needs to be exercised in rapidly advancing 
JFM to areas where scarcity may not be such a large issue.   
 
Our most important findings are that fuelwood consumption and participation are linked 
and participation has a significant positive impact on consumption.  Village participation 
has a positive but insignificant effect.  This is a very interesting finding.  It suggests that 
JFM and other forms of community forestry are benefiting participants in the short to 
medium term.  However, these benefits cannot really be called program benefits because 
the presence of the program at the village level does not seem to matter.  We think that 
participants benefit because they are able to take part in forest related activities and/or 
because they are better informed about rules and regulations.  Our results also do not 
support any negative impacts of community forestry programs on fuelwood consumption. 
 
Finally, we acknowledge that JFM, the state-initiated community forestry program, has 
changed in important ways in the last five years.  Formerly nationalized NTFP revenues 
and medium-term timber benefits are now accruing to village communities.  The number 
of JFM communities has also expanded.   Thus, our results, which focus on fuelwood 
consumption in 1998, are indicative of impacts but do not present the full picture.  Further, 
the effect of people’s use of natural resources on forests can change over time, depending 
on markets and institutions as well as the resilience of forests themselves. In order to probe 
these dynamic effects, we would need time-series data.  Future studies would benefit 
tremendously from carefully obtained base-line surveys and time-series information.   
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Tables 
 
Table 1.  Summary statistics of village level variables          
Variables Mean
Standard
Deviation Minimum  Maximum
CF Village  0.08 0.27 0  1
Andhra Pradesh  0.17 0.38 0  1
Madhya Pradesh  0.20 0.40 0  1
Orissa 0.27 0.44 0  1
Uttar Pradesh  0.31 0.46 0  1
West Bengal  0.06 0.23 0  1
Forest Dummy  0.43 0.50 0  1
Forest Outside Village Within Reach Dummy  0.50 0.50 0  1
All Weather Road Dummy  0.64 0.48 0  1
Post Office Dummy  0.40 0.49 0  1
Middle School Education Dummy  0.73 0.44 0  1
Self Help Group Dummy  0.15 0.36 0  1
Proportion ST  0.19 0.31 0  1
Proportion SC  0.24 0.23 0  1
Proportion OBC  0.30 0.28 0  1
Majority Fuelwood Dependent Dummy  0.37 0.48 0  1
Gini Coefficient for land possessed in village   0.51 0.17 0  0.92
Total number of villages 524           25
 
Table 2.  Probit analysis of determination of village level participation in CF 
Dependent variable:  CF Village   Coefficient   
Standard 
Errors 
Constant -3.02** 0.61 
Andhra Pradesh  -0.04  0.36 
Madhya Pradesh  0.13  0.26 
Uttar Pradesh  0.15  0.35 
West Bengal  0.76+ 0.43 
Forest Dummy  0.86** 0.24 
Forest Outside Village Within Reach Dummy  0.13  0.27 
All Weather Road Dummy  0.11  0.22 
Post Office Dummy  -0.14  0.23 
Middle School Education Dummy  0.58*  0.25 
Self Help Group Dummy  0.17  0.30 
Proportion ST  0.01  0.49 
Proportion SC  -0.61  0.60 
Proportion OBC  0.15  0.52 
Majority Fuelwood Dependent Dummy  0.96** 0.28 
Gini Coefficient for land possessed in village   -0.29  0.61 
N 524   
Log likelihood  -106.68   
Pseudo R squared    0.25     
Notes:  ** significant at 1 percent, * significant at 5 percent, + significant at 10 percent 
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Table 3.  Summary statistics of variables used in household analysis    
Variables Mean
Standard
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Annual Fuelwood Consumption (Kg)  750.59 877.17 0  20000 
Households Participating in CF  0.02 0.13 0  1 
Andhra Pradesh  0.18 0.38 0  1 
Madhya Pradesh  0.19 0.39 0  1 
Orissa 0.26 0.44 0  1 
Uttar Pradesh  0.31 0.46 0  1 
West Bengal  0.06 0.23 0  1 
Fuelwood used for consumption & enterprise  0.04 0.20 0  1 
Self Employed in Non-Agriculture  0.10 0.31 0  1 
Agricultural Labor  0.38 0.48 0  1 
Non-Agricultural Labor  0.06 0.24 0  1 
Other Non Agricultural Occupation  0.10 0.30 0  1 
Scheduled Tribe  0.18 0.38 0  1 
Scheduled Caste  0.24 0.43 0  1 
Other Backward Class  0.30 0.46 0  1 
Land Possessed (ha)  0.82 1.65 0  48 
Own Phone, Radio, TV Dummy  0.29 0.45 0  1 
Read Newspaper Dummy  0.13 0.33 0  1 
Female Headed Households  0.07 0.26 0  1 
Average Age of Household Members  26.72 11.33 5  75 
Household Size   5.04 2.53 1  23 
Fuelwood Price (Rs/Kg)  0.75 0.32 0.10  2.86 
Total Govt Forest Area (ha)  70.32 252.38 0  3044 
Total Village Common Land (ha)  74.85 207.25 0  2417 
All Weather Road Dummy  0.65 0.48 0  1 
CF Village  0.08 0.27 0  1 
Proportion of CF households   0.02 0.11 0  1 
Total number of households 8307         
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Table 4.  Household participation analysis, probit and MLE methods          
   Probit     MLE (Part One) 
Dependent Variable: 
Households Participating in CF  Coef.   
Standard
Errors     Coef.   
Standard
Errors 
Constant -2.74** 0.24  -2.59  ** 0.27
Andhra Pradesh  -0.52** 0.17  -0.58 ** 0.22
Madhya Pradesh  0.27  0.19  0.33 +  0.18
Uttar Pradesh  0.32+ 0.18  0.43 ** 0.14
West Bengal  0.03  0.26  0.19    0.25
Fuelwood used for consumption & enterprise -0.79** 0.27 -1.03  ** 0.24
Self Employed in Non-Agriculture  -0.26  0.18  -0.02    0.16
Agricultural Labor  -0.06  0.14  -0.01    0.10
Non-Agricultural Labor  -0.34  0.24  -0.26 +  0.13
Other Non Agricultural Occupation  -0.53  0.32  -0.16    0.20
Scheduled Tribe  -0.04  0.19  -0.10    0.18
Scheduled Caste  -0.88** 0.34  -0.59 +  0.31
Other Backward Class  -0.08  0.12  -0.06    0.10
Asset Index  0.02  0.06  0.02    0.03
Read Newspaper Dummy  0.59** 0.17  0.45 ** 0.11
Female Headed Households  0.11  0.15  0.12    0.09
Fuelwood Price (Rs/Kg)  0.02  0.19  0.48 ** 0.19
Total Govt Forest Area ('000 ha)  -0.05  0.20  -0.15    0.18
Total Village Common Land ('000 ha)  -1.07+ 0.63  -1.27 *  0.61
All Weather Road Dummy  -0.15  0.13  -0.14    0.11
Proportion of CF households in Village  5.52** 0.48  3.68 ** 1.04
CF Village   0.03  0.28  0.11    0.23
N 8307      8307     
Log likelihood  -205.44498      -67553.96 
#  
Pseudo R squared  0.73          
     
Notes:  ** significant at 1 percent, * significant at 5 percent, + significant at 10 percent     
MLE method estimates CF participation and fuelwood consumption simultaneously.     
# log likelihood ratio of joint estimation.  The coefficients of fuelwood consumption are in table 5. 
Wald test of independent equations. (rho = 0): chi2(1) =     7.65   Prob > chi2 = 0.0057     
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Table 5.  Household fuelwood consumption analysis, OLS and MLE methods       
   OLS     MLE (Part Two) 
Dependent Variable: 
Annual Fuelwood Consumption  Coef.   
Standard
Errors     Coef.   
Standard
Errors 
Constant 1043.67** 118.49  1056.83  ** 120.33
Andhra Pradesh  -251.87** 78.79  -248.52 ** 79.11
Madhya Pradesh  -324.66** 82.35  -320.95 ** 82.66
Uttar Pradesh  -530.83** 80.05  -523.15 ** 79.59
West Bengal  -444.41** 94.88  -447.61 ** 95.09
Fuelwood used for consumption & enterprise 209.25   130.89  211.48    132.80
Self Employed in Non-Agriculture  -35.85   51.20  -37.23    51.22
Agricultural Labor  109.29** 32.44  101.27 ** 33.20
Non-Agricultural Labor  59.08   69.16  63.22    69.07
Other Non Agricultural Occupation -165.88** 46.95  -163.00  ** 47.05
Scheduled Tribe  151.20*  74.08  146.42 *  74.50
Scheduled Caste  38.64   51.73  42.87    51.62
Other Backward Class  5.46   54.35  -3.70    54.47
Asset Index  -40.84** 14.85  -40.82 ** 14.93
Read Newspaper Dummy  -242.48** 44.75  -242.68 ** 44.40
Female Headed Households  -53.36  34.69  -51.90   34.66
Average Age of Household  -0.38  0.89  -0.53   0.88
Household Size  52.63** 6.32  50.33 ** 6.51
Fuelwood Price (Rs/Kg)  -398.35** 71.83  -400.42 ** 72.72
Total Govt Forest Area (ha) 0.22*  0.11  0.25  *  0.12
Total Village Common Land (ha)  0.21*  0.10  0.22 *  0.10
All Weather Road Dummy  -37.58   48.51  -36.51    48.80
CF Village   59.76   101.95  -81.32    115.45
Households Participating in CF  28.82   109.98  744.05 ** 228.73
N  8307     8307    
R Squared / Log likelihood  0.16         -67553.96 
#    
Notes:  ** significant at 1 percent, * significant at 5 percent, + significant at 10 percent     
MLE method estimates CF participation and fuelwood consumption simultaneously.     
# log likelihood ratio of joint estimation.  The coefficients of household CF participation are in table 4. 
Wald test of independent equations. (rho = 0): chi2(1) =     7.65   Prob > chi2 = 0.0057     
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Table 6. Average differences in fuelwood consumption for 
participating households and CF villages. 
Firewood Consumption  Households CF Villages
A. Mean Difference comparison        
Fuelwood consumption  259**  202* 
       For participant only:        
               Asset non-poor  80     
               Do not read newspaper  829**     
               Other Castes  179*     
B.  MLE based estimates        
Fuelwood consumption  744**  -90 
C. Propensity score based estimates        
Nearest Neighbor, equal weights  172  -32 
Radius Matching  290**  -10 
Kernel Matching  109   -13  
Notes:  ** significant at 1 percent, * significant at 5 percent. 
          Asset poor households are defined as those in the bottom two 
          quintiles of the asset index constructed from possessed land 
          and other assets. 
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Table A.1.  Mean differences in Non-CF and CF village characteristics       






Average Firewood Consumption  753 642.12 955 *  642.57
Andhra Pradesh  0.18 0.38 0.10   0.30
Madhya Pradesh  0.19 0.39 0.28   0.45
Orissa 0.26 0.44 0.40  *  0.50
Uttar Pradesh  0.32 0.47 0.13   0.33
West Bengal  0.05 0.22 0.10   0.30
Forest Dummy  0.39 0.49 0.88 **  0.33
Forest Outside Village Within Reach Dummy  0.47 0.50 0.83 **  0.38
All Weather Road Dummy  0.64 0.48 0.63   0.49
Post Office Dummy  0.41 0.49 0.30   0.46
Middle School Education Dummy  0.73 0.45 0.83   0.38
Self Help Group Dummy  0.15 0.36 0.15   0.36
Proportion ST  0.17 0.30 0.37 **  0.33
Proportion SC  0.24 0.23 0.17 *  0.20
Proportion OBC  0.30 0.28 0.25   0.24
Majority Firewood Dependent Dummy  0.33 0.47 0.85 **  0.36
Note:  Differences are ** significant at 1 percent, and * significant at 5 percent.     
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Table A.2.  Characteristics of CF and Non-CF households.          
  
Non CF 
Households CF  Households 
Variables Mean 
Standard
Deviation Mean    
Standard
Deviation
Annual Fuelwood Consumption (Kg) 745.88 880.87 1005.15  **  595.64
Andhra Pradesh  0.18 0.38 0.07   0.26
Madhya Pradesh  0.19 0.39 0.26   0.44
Orissa 0.26 0.44 0.46    0.50
Uttar Pradesh  0.32 0.47 0.09   0.29
West Bengal  0.06 0.23 0.11   0.32
Fuelwood used for consumption & enterprise 0.04 0.20 0.07    0.26
Self Employed in Non-Agriculture 0.10 0.31 0.07    0.26
Agricultural Labor  0.37 0.48 0.54 **  0.50
Non-Agricultural Labor  0.06 0.24 0.01 **  0.08
Other Non Agricultural Occupation 0.10 0.30 0.05  **  0.22
Scheduled Tribe  0.18 0.38 0.38 **  0.49
Scheduled Caste  0.24 0.43 0.07 **  0.26
Other Backward Class  0.30 0.46 0.39 *  0.49
Land Possessed (ha)  0.82 1.66 0.81   1.27
Own Phone, Radio, TV Dummy  0.29 0.45 0.22 *  0.41
Read Newspaper Dummy  0.13 0.33 0.11   0.31
Female Headed Households  0.07 0.26 0.03 **  0.18
Average Age of Household Members 26.77 11.37 24.35  **  8.32
Household Size  5.03 2.54 5.54 **  2.66
Fuelwood Price (Rs/Kg)  0.75 0.32 0.74   0.34
Total Govt Forest Area (ha) 70.44 254.23 64.12    114.67
Total Village Common Land (ha)  75.97 208.98 14.38 **  20.03
All Weather Road Dummy  0.65 0.48 0.59   0.49
CF Village  0.06 0.24 0.83 **  0.37
Proportion of CF households in Village  0.01 0.05 0.68 **  0.33
Note:  Differences are ** significant at 1 percent, and * significant at 5 percent.     
Total number of households are 8307 of which 151 are CF households.     
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Table A.3.  Probit analysis of determination of village level participation in CF with Heterogeneity Index
Dependent variable:  CF Village   Coefficient       
Standard 
Errors 
Constant  -3.07 **  0.50
Andhra Pradesh  -0.08   0.35
Madhya Pradesh  0.12   0.26
Uttar Pradesh  0.06   0.32
West Bengal  0.65 +  0.39
Forest Dummy  0.87 **  0.24
Forest Outside Village Within Reach Dummy  0.09   0.27
All Weather Road Dummy  0.09   0.22
Post Office Dummy  -0.16   0.23
Middle School Education Dummy  0.58 *  0.24
Self Help Group Dummy  0.17   0.30
Heterogeneity Index  0.30   0.53
Majority Fuelwood Dependent Dummy  0.94 **  0.27
Gini Coefficient for land possessed in village   -0.46   0.62
N  524    
Log likelihood  -107.55    
Pseudo R squared    0.24        
Notes:  ** significant at 1 percent, * significant at 5 percent, + significant at 10 percent 
 